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Philosophy of Intellect in the Long Commentary
on the De anima of Averroes
John Shannon Hendrix

This essay will present an interpretation of the philosophy of intellect of
Averroes (1126–98) in the Long Commentary on the De anima, by examining how Averroes expands on the De anima of Aristotle; by evaluating the
commentaries on Averroes by F. Brentano (1838–1917), P. Merlan (1897–
1968), H. A. Davidson and R. C. Taylor; by suggesting precedents for the
thought of Averroes in the Enneads of the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus
(204–70); by examining the possible influence of Averroes on the Scholastic
philosopher Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253); and by suggesting Averroes’
concept of material intellect as a predecessor to concepts in Transcendental
Idealism and Structural Linguistics.
Averroes was “an excessive enthusiast of Aristotle,” in the words of
Franz Brentano, “concerned to develop the latter’s pure doctrine.”1 Nevertheless, his interpretation of Aristotle, considered to be “mystical,” his placing of the intellects outside the soul, taken to be a rejection of the
immortality of the individual soul, led Thomas Aquinas to declare: “Non tam
peripateticus quam peripateticae philosophiae depravator!”2 In his Long
Commentary on the De anima, Averroes posits three separate intelligences
functioning in the anima rationalis or the rational soul: agent or active intellect (intellectus agens); material or passible intellect (intellectus materialis,
intellectus passibilis or intellectus possibilis); and speculative intellect (intellectus speculativus), or actualized or acquired intellect (intellectus adeptus).
In the De anima 3.1.5,3 “there are three parts of the intellect in the soul; the
first is the receptive intellect, the second, the active intellect, and the third is
actual intellection…,” that is, material, agent, and speculative.
This is based on Averroes’ interpretation of Aristotle’s De anima
3.5.430a, 10–15.4 While Aristotle located both material and active intellects
in the soul, Averroes locates only their functions in the soul, while the intellects themselves are eternal substances.5 Not wanting to be inconsistent with
Aristotle, thought requires both the activity of the active intellect and the receptivity of the material intellect, according to Averroes. The result, though,
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is that the “first principles of thought”6 are given without an act of will, but
the active intellect can be induced through the active will to illuminate the
material intellect and images in the imaginative faculty, the formae imaginativae or phantasmata in the imaginatio. The passible intellect of Aristotle
(De anima 3.5.430a24) is a “sensory power,”7 and Averroes connects it to
both imagination and cognition (virtus cogitativa), as Franz Brentano explains in The Psychology of Aristotle.
While material intellect is “partly generable and corruptible, partly eternal,” corporeal and incorporeal, the active intellect is purely eternal and incorporeal. Active intellect is the final entelechy, or final actualization of
potentiality. Material intellect is a possible intellect, a possibility, because it
is both corporeal and incorporeal, thus neither corporeal nor incorporeal, a
controversial position taken by Averroes which is difficult to rationalize.
Material intellect becomes actualized intellect, or “energized” intellect in the
analysis of Philip Merlan in Monopsychism Mysticism Metaconsciousness,8
through the affect of the agent intellect, which illuminates, as a First Cause,
the intelligible species, the species apprehensibilis or forma imaginativa, the
residue of the species sensibilis, the sensation or sensible form, in the anima
rationalis or soul. The illuminated species apprehensibilis or intelligible acts
on material intellect until material intellect becomes actualized or energized
intellect, at which point intellect is able to act on the intelligible. In the
words of Merlan, “material intelligence becomes transformed into what
Averroes calls speculative intelligence.” The speculative intelligence of
Averroes is identical to the productive intelligence of Alexander of Aphrodisias.
When the development of the intellectus speculativus is complete, it is
perfected through active intellect.9 Averroes does not fully explain how the
two intellects can be connected in this way, beyond the mediating role of the
imaginative faculty. This problem is explored in detail by Paul Sidney Christ
in The Psychology of the Active Intellect of Averroes. Averroes fails to reconcile the material (hylic) and active intellects posited by Aristotle. For Plotinus and previous commentators on Aristotle, the explanation is given as the
pneumatic, but this is not given in Averroes. Both material and speculative
intelligence are seen as being immortal, but the immortality is compromised
by the perishability of the formae imaginativae in the imaginatio, the mechanism by which the material intellect is actualized.10
The formae imaginativae, as the basis of actualized intellect, are both
corporeal and incorporeal; they bridge the gap or merge the two in the proc-
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ess of intellection. The formae imaginativae, like the sensations of which
they are residues, are partially connected to the material or corporeal, and
cannot be archetypes from without, but intelligibles within human intellect.
The affect of active intellect on material intellect toward actualized intellect
is a combination of the illumination and the resulting mechanisms of intellectus speculativus. The affect is in the combination of the receptivity of material intellect as a passive substratum of cognitive and intellectual activity,
like a blank tablet, and the will or desire on the part of the thinking subject to
develop cognitive and intellectual virtus.
In his De anima (3.7.431b2), Aristotle wrote that the human intellect
thinks the forms in images. Aristotle compared the active intellect (nous) to
light itself, in relation to the potential intellect, what can be taken as ratio or
discursive reason, as “in a sense light makes potential colours into actual
colours” (3.5.430a10–25).11 Aristotle contrasted the active or productive intellect, nous poietikos, with the potential or passive intellect, nous pathetikos. The active intellect illuminates what is intelligible in the sensible
world. For Aristotle, phantasia or imagination is not part of intellect; it
merely supplies intellect with the sensible form, which the intellect illuminates, as light makes potential colors actual, to form the intelligible form in
active intellect.
In the De anima 3.7 of Aristotle, human intellect thinks the form or species, and processes it conceptually, as an image, which must be imprinted in
the imaginative faculty. In 3.4, the sensible object is related to sense perception as the form of the object is related to intellect, the intelligible form, in
relation to sensible form as it is imprinted in the imagination through sense
perception. The intellect is to what is intelligible as sense perception is to
what is perceptible. The intellect is receptive of the form as an intelligible; it
must think the form in order to perceive it. An object might be perceived as a
sensible form alone, but in that way the object would be singular and individual, not part of a totality. In De anima 3.4, although the intellect receives
a form as an imprint in sensation and becomes identical in thought with the
form, the intellect is not affected or altered in any way by the form or the
sense object connected with it.
The active intellect is “a cause which is productive…” (De anima
3.5.430a12). According to Aristotle, the intellect is passive in that it becomes
all things, and active in that it makes all things. In the De anima
(3.5.430a14–15), Aristotle distinguished between the quality of mind which
is “what it is by virtue of becoming all things,” and the quality “which is
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what it is by virtue of making all things,” the making of the actual from the
potential. In the De anima of Aristotle, “in the individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual knowledge” (3.5.430a21–22). The active intellect illuminates the intelligible form in the sensible form (this double
illumination can also be found in Plotinus), as formed by the imagination or
phantasia, from the imprint in sense perception (as in Plotinus), which is
then given to discursive reason, material intellect. Phantasia is composed of
afterimages of sensations, mnemic residues or traces in the oculus mentis.
Phantasia, though it is not part of intellect, is necessary for the functioning
of intellect.
In Averroes’ De anima 3.1.5, the existence of intelligibles or first principles in intellect, as they are understood in actualized intellect, “does not simply result from the reception of the object,” the sensible form in sense
perception in material intellect, “but consists in attention to, or perception of,
the represented forms…,” the cognition of the forms in actualized intellect
wherein they can be understood as intelligibles, which requires both the participation of active intellect and the motivation of the individual for intellectual development. This was also described by Plotinus. The goal of
intellectual development for Averroes is to achieve union with active intellect, the final entelechy, and through this union the highest bliss in life can
be achieved. Such bliss can only be achieved “in the eve of life.”
Material intellect, in that it is only a possibility, contains neither actual
intellectual cognition nor a faculty for intellectual cognition. Both of these
are only possible in actualized intellect, through intellectus speculativus, acquired intellect, and the affect of agent intellect. Material intellect contains
only the possibility of being united with active intellect; all material intellects are equally potential. While they are all part of “the single transcendent
material intellect shared by all human beings,”12 as described by Richard C.
Taylor, the power of the material intellect in Averroes’ thought should not
be overestimated. Intellectus speculativus is developed as the oculus mentis
of the anima rationalis develops a vocabulary of images or phantasmata
stored in the imaginatio or phantasia. The phantasm is corporeal, and potentially intelligible, as the material intellect has the potential to understand the
intelligible. The sensible form can only potentially be an intelligible form if
it is predetermined by the intelligible form. In the De anima 3.5.36,13 “this
sort of action,” of the active intellect, “which consists in generating intelligibles and actualizing them, exists in us prior to the action of the intellect,”
prior to the formation of the perceived form in imaginatio. The corporeal

5
condition of material intellect acts as a substrate for actualized and agent intellect, the partially and completely incorporeal, only as a blank tablet on
which letters are written. The corporeal presence of the letters, the sensible
forms in phantasia, is predetermined by the writing of the letters, based on
the idea of the letter, the intelligible form, which pre-exists the letter itself.
The material intellect alone for Averroes differentiates the human being
from other animals, not in its potential for intellect but in its sensory powers,
the intellectus passibilis of Aristotle. The intellectus passibilis is able to distinguish and compare individual sensory representations in the virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa, which provides the material substrate for
intellectus speculativus. The virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa might also be ascribed to the sensus communis, common sense; they are both “perishable body powers”14 as described by Taylor. In distinguishing and
comparing the phantasmata in imaginatio, intellect applies shape and form
to otherwise nebulous, inchoate images. It also organizes them in totalities,
in the most rudimentary processes of abstraction, and defines them in relation to organizational systems, such as geometry and mathematics. This is
also described by Plotinus. Averroes suggests that the sensory powers themselves entail an element of intellection, in that the imprint of the sensible
form would depend on the formation of the intelligible form.
In the De anima 3.1.7,15 “the cogitative faculty,” virtus cogitativa, “belongs to the genus of sensible faculties. But the imaginative and the cogitative and the recollective” faculties, imaginatio, ratio and memoria, “all
cooperate in producing the image of the sensible thing,” the species sensibilis, “so that the separate rational faculty can perceive it,” as a reflected image
in the oculus mentis, “and extract the universal intention,” the intelligible,
“and finally receive, i.e., comprehend it.” In the words of Brentano, “Once
they have done this, and once the activity of the active intellect has made the
images intelligible, the material intellect, which stands to all intelligible
forms in the relation of potentiality, receives from the images the concepts of
sensible things.”16
The form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mechanisms
of intellect in sense perception, as in Plotinus. As Averroes explains in the
De anima 3.1.5,17 “It is necessary to assign two subjects to these actually existing intelligibles,” the intelligible as it exists in the form of the sensory object, “one of which is the subject due to which the intelligibles are true, i.e.,
forms, which are truthful images,” sensible forms; “the other, the subject due
to which the intelligibles are only a single one of the entities in the world,
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and this is the material intellect itself.” The intellect of the perceiving subject
in sensory perception is as responsible for how the sensible world is perceived as the forms which are assigned to the sensible world.
The Long Commentary contains Averroes’ fullest account of the relation
between active and material intellect.18 The sensible form in the oculus mentis exists as a potential intelligible, and the material intellect, which is engaged in the formation of the sensible form, is capable of receiving the
intelligible from the active intellect. The active intellect makes what is potentially intelligible, actually intelligible. The material intellect is the passible intellect, intellectus passibilis, described by Aristotle in his De anima
(3.5.430a24), which distinguishes and compares the individual representations of sense experience in the oculus mentis. Averroes also calls the passible intellect virtus aestimativa (a term used by Avicenna), and virtus
cogitativa (a term used by Grosseteste). The intellectus passibilis should be
distinguished from the virtus aestimativa naturalis, which is judgment by
natural instinct, and can be found in all animals.
Averroes compares intellectus passibilis to phantasia or imaginatio, in
De anima 3.1.20,19 the image-making virtus or power of intellect in the formation of the phatasmata. Following Aristotle, Averroes divides material
intellect into the sensus communis, or sense perception, the phantasia, the
virtus cogitativa, and memoria, in ascending order from corporeal to spiritual, as the active intellect is increasingly engaged. The material intellect
cannot distinguish or apprehend intelligibles on its own. The material, passible intellect, becomes an acquired intellect, through the activities of
phantasia and memoria, and it is based in the acquisition of habitual
knowledge through exercise, intellectus in habitu, as a material intellectus
speculativus. The passible intellect operates according to its capacity for
receptivity, not according to an ability to form concepts or abstractions.
Intellectual knowledge for Averroes must be distinguished from the habitual knowledge of passible intellect. Intellectual knowledge is the product
of the merging of the material intellect, which is considered to be incorporeal, despite its dependence on the sensible, and the active intellect, which
transforms the sensible form into the intelligible form, stripping it of its corporeal attachment and converting it from a particular to a universal, which
makes the potentially intelligible phantasmata in the oculus mentis intelligible. The intellectus agens is the intellect which acts, which moves the material intellect, the intellect which only receives or is affected, as described in
De anima 3.1.5. The active intellect allows the material intellect to be moved
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by imagination. The intellectus passibilis, as virtus cogitativa in combination
with phantasia and memoria, forms the phantasm in order that it can be perceived by the active intellect, and prepares it to receive the active intellect,
by which the sensible becomes the intelligible, which can be comprehended
as a universal.
In the De anima of Averroes, the transformation from potentiality to actuality takes place in the speculative intellect, which includes the intellectus
in habitu, and is distinguished from the agent or productive intellect, intellectus agens, and the material or passible intellect, intellectus passibilis.20
The actualizing of the material intellect by the productive intellect is the result of the productive intellect illuminating the residues of sensations existing in the mind, the formae imaginativae, or mnemic resides. The formae act
on the material intellect after they have been illuminated, and material intellect is transformed into speculative intellect, which combines the material
and productive intellects, the physical and eternal or archetypal, corporeal
and incorporeal.
Averroes describes the material intellect as the transparent medium in
relation to the active intellect, as light. In the relation between nous and discursive reason, the activity of the intellectus agens must precede that of the
intellectus materialis. In the material intellect, individual representations are
distinguished, in the virtus aestimativa naturalis. The material form is seen
as color in relation to the light, resulting from the intentio in the imaginative
faculty, or phantasia. In other words, as Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, 21
“the relation of the intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the
same as the relation of the sensible to the senses.” The material intellect receives the active intellect in the same way that transparent bodies “receive
light and colors at the same time; the light, however, brings forth the colors”
(De anima 3.5.36).22 The intelligible form results from the cooperation of the
material and active intellects. The active intellect “illuminates both the material intellect and images in the imaginative faculty of the soul,”23 in the
words of Davidson, an illumination induced through the exercise of the will.
For Averroes, light is the entelechy (entelecheia, actualization or perfectio) of the transparent medium, just as the active intellect is the entelechy of
material intellect. Averroes follows Alfarabi in his explanation of light, but
fails to distinguish between light and the source of light.24 This nevertheless
results in a new interpretation of light as entelechy on the part of Averroes,
based on his interpretation of Aristotle. The transparent is not affected by
color in any way unless it is illuminated, just as discursive reason is not af-
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fected in any way by intelligibles unless it is illuminated and perfected by
the active intellect, the higher intellect or nous. When the material intellect is
perfected by the agent intellect it is joined to it as an adeptio or acquisition,
and the combination becomes intellectus adeptus or acquired intellect.
Averroes sees the material intellect as a medium rather than an organ, enabling consciousness of intelligible thoughts, through the illumination of the
formae imaginativae in the imaginatio.25 The same function of phantasia
was described by Plotinus.
Once the combination of the material intellect and the active intellect has
formed the species apprehensibilis and allowed the virtus cogitativa to apprehend the intelligible, the concept and universal are able to play a role in
cogitation. As Averroes says in De anima 3.3.18, when “the relation of the
intentions in imagination to the material intellect is the same as the relation
of the sensible to the senses, as Aristotle says, it is necessary to assume another mover which makes them actually move the material intellect, and this
simply means that it makes actual thoughts by separating them from matter.”
The intellectus adeptus produces the intelligible form when the sensus communis, virtus cogitativa and imaginatio in the nous hylikos establish a foundation in cooperation to provide material for the intellectus adeptus, which it
then processes in relation to the active intellect. The intelligible form is a hybrid of the universal concept which is the product of the active intellect, and
the sensible form, which is the product of sense perception and imaginatio.
The intelligible form unites the virtus cogitativa with the active intellect, and
sense perception with intellection.
The material intellect, virtus cogitativa, in that it is tied to the particulars
of sense perception, is a singular entity in each individual, and cannot produce meaning or communication, cannot unite the cognitive faculties of each
individual. The active intellect, on the other hand, in that it is capable of
formulating intelligibles, which are incorporeal and not tied to the materials
of individual sense perception, is able to unite particular individuals engaging in cognition in order to create a shared intellection which produces
communication and meaning. This is sometimes referred to as “monopsychism,” and is also a basic proposition of Structural Linguistics in the twentieth century. In De anima 3.1.5,26 “And since it has already been shown that
the intellect cannot unite with all individuals by multiplying according to
their number with respect to that part that is the opposite of intellect qua
form,” material intellect, “the only thing that remains is that this intellect
unites with all of us through the union with us of concepts or intentions pre-
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sent to the mind…”. While the operation of the virtus cogitativa is particular
to each individual, the intelligible form, which it receives from the active intellect, is universal and shared by every individual, as it is retained as a permanent archetype in intellection.
When the intelligible is received by the material intellect, it is subject to
generation and corruption, multiplicity and accident. The intelligible form,
when it is connected to the sensible form in material intellect, is not a permanent mnemic residue as an archetype, but is fluctuating and impermanent
in its corporeal manifestation. But the intelligible form does not disappear
when its corresponding sensible form does, it merely ceases to participate in
the sensible form. In De anima 3.1.5,27 “And if intelligibles of this kind are
considered, insofar as they have being simpliciter and not in respect of some
individual,” as universals, “then it must truly be said of them that they have
eternal being, and that they are not sometimes intelligibles and sometimes
not, but that they always exist in the same manner…”. The intelligible form
can participate in the sensible form, of its own volition, or the volition of the
active intellect, but the sensible form cannot participate in the intelligible
form, in its corporeal limitations, in the same way that color, for example,
because it is tied to the corporeal body, cannot participate in light, although
they are perceived simultaneously and are undifferentiated in perception.
Just because the sensible form is no longer visible in the oculus mentis
does not mean that the intelligible form that is attached to it ceases to exist.
The material intellect, in that it is part incorporeal and eternal, also always
has the potential to understand the intelligible, the abstract concept. Whether
it does or not depends on the degree of union with active intellect and the
degree of development of virtus, not on the level of potentiality. Material intellect is also always thinking; it is not capable of not thinking, which shows
the presence of the eternal in it.
The material intellect of every individual is capable of receiving the intelligible form; individual material intellects receive intelligibles to varying
degrees, depending on the extent to which the individual aspires to intelligible knowledge. It is not that the material intellect is not always thinking and
does not always have the potential to receive intelligibles, it is just that it is
not always united with active intellect. It is through the perfected union between the material intellect and the active intellect that intelligibles are apprehended, and that a beatific state can be achieved by the most complete
apprehension of them as possible. Intelligibles come to material intellect
naturally as first principles, as in the proten entelecheian of Aristotle, the
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first entelechy, but any further intelligibles derived from the first principles
require the volition of the material intellect. In De anima 3.5.36,28 all individual material intellects are capable of receiving intelligibles naturally; the
active intellect “is combined with us potentially whenever the speculative
intelligibles are potentially present within us…”.
All individual material intellects are capable of some ability to form concepts and abstract ideas at a basic level, but beyond that intellectual development varies among individuals according to the level of volition (what
Grosseteste would call solertia). The emphasis on individual will is a key
element of Averroes’ thought. Intelligibles are apprehended the more completely as knowledge of the material world is greater, according to Averroes,
as knowledge of sensible objects depends on knowledge of intelligibles.
Complete knowledge of the material world results in complete unity between
the material intellect and the active intellect, the final entelechy achieved in
the “eve of life.”
Such an entelechy is the result of the process of active intellect combining “with us through conjoining the speculative intelligibles,” in the union of
the sensible and intelligible, in stages of potentiality and actuality. The final
entelechy requires actuality, in actualized intellect, intellectus adeptus, rather
than potentiality, in material intellect, so the great mass of potentiality which
defines the substratum of human material intellect must be overcome to a
great degree, and takes a long time, an entire life. The reason why material
intellect is only united with active intellect at the end, and not the beginning,
is that “potency is part of us so long as there is in us form that exists only potentially,” which could be seen as an infinity. Knowledge and understanding
are possible only in actualized intellect, which must no longer be potential
intellect. Intellectual knowledge, and philosophy itself, which is eternal, as
an intelligible, must be seen as the ultimate goal of human life, and the cause
of the most perfect bliss.
Aristotle, in his De anima, defined light as a transparent medium. For
Averroes, the material intellect receives intelligible thoughts as the transparent medium receives colors through illumination. As light makes colors visible to the eye, so light makes intelligibles understandable to the material
intellect, discursive reason, resulting in abstract thoughts and concepts.
Averroes sees the material intellect as a medium, as light is in the sensible
world, an eternal substance independent of the mechanisms of the senses, as
much as the active intellect. In the De anima of Averroes, intellect must be
defined as unmixed, in particular as unmixed with the particulars of sense
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experience and sense knowledge. Material intellect is not altered in any way
by the reception of intellect, because, though it is connected to the body, it is
not a body itself; it is more of a blank slate, as for Aristotle in De anima
3.4.429b30–430a10, the forms of thought “must be in it just as characters
may be said to be on a writing-tablet on which as yet nothing actually stands
written…”; material intellect is thus the “place of forms” as described by Aristotle in De anima 3.4.429a27–28.
For Averroes, following Aristotle, it is necessary that the material or receiving intellect be unmixed so that it can receive and understand all things.
If material intellect were a form itself, then it could not receive a form. Material intellect is activated to the extent to which it is able to understand the
forms of things which exist in actuality outside the rational soul, or the potential for thought. The rational soul, anima rationalis, considers the forms
or intentiones which are in the imaginative faculty, and material intellect is
activated in its process of abstracting forms from material things and creating first intelligibles, intelligibles in actuality derived from potentials in potentiality; in that way, intellect goes from being passive to being active.
When intellect is moved by intelligibles, it is passive, but when intellect
comes to move intelligibles, it is active; thus the anima rationalis consists of
two distinct powers, the passive and active. Both powers are unmixed, incorporeal, neither generable nor corruptible.
In the De anima 3.5.3629 of Averroes, “there are formed in the soul of
man two parts of the intellect, one being that which receives,” and “another
being that which acts,” the former being the material intellect, the latter being the actualized intellect, which “makes it the case that the intentions and
concepts existing in the faculty of imagination,” as connected to the phantasmata in imaginatio, which are illuminated by active intellect, “actually
move the material intellect, while previously they moved it only potentially…”. Further, “those two parts are neither generated nor corruptible” as
corporeal, and “the relation of the active to the receptive intellect is just like
the relation of form to matter.” The sensible impression, or phantasma, thus
acts on matter in sense perception in material intellect, in the virtus aestimativa or virtus cogitativa, dianoia. Further, in the De anima 3.5.36,30 there are
“two modes of action” in intellect, “one of which belongs to the genus of affections” in material intellect, the other belonging to “the genus of actions”
in actualized intellect, “whose function it is to abstract the forms and to strip
them of matter, which is nothing other than making them into actual intelligibles, while previously they were only potential intelligibles,” the sensible
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form made known as the intelligible form.
For Averroes, the species must be transformed in order for it to be received by material intellect, as in the Liber Naturalis of Avicenna; it must be
differentiated as an intelligible in potentiality as opposed to an intelligible in
actuality. Material intellect is not corporeal, in that it is capable of receiving
corporeal forms, though it must be connected to the corporeal. As Taylor explains, “it is not possible for the material intellect itself to be a particular or
definite individual entity, since the received intelligible would be contracted
to the particular nature of its subject, the material intellect.”31 At the same
time, material intellect cannot be composed of forms, in that it is capable of
receiving sensible forms. Material intellect is thus neither matter nor simple
form, form separable from body. It is capable of receiving the sensible form,
and it is capable of producing the intelligible form, but it is neither matter
nor intelligible itself, but rather an indefinable substrate for both.
Material intellect must be defined as being something in between the
corporeal and incorporeal, as the mechanism which can connect the two.
Material intellect cannot be seen to contain anything similar to the species or
form which it is capable of receiving, but it can be seen to contain something
similar to the genus of the species which it receives, and to the predication of
the species which it receives. In other words, there must be a predisposition
of the material intellect, while it is a power separate from the body, and has
no material form which allows it to receive the sensible form, which is the a
priori existence of the intelligible form which governs the perception of the
sensible form and its transformation into an intelligible form in the process
of abstraction and conceptualization in actualized or acquired intellect.
Averroes concludes that material intellect can only be defined as a possibility, as Aristotle said that it has only the nature of the possibility for receiving the intelligible forms, and that before it thinks, it does not exist. The
material intelligible form, a seeming contradiction in terms, can only exist if
the sensible form is seen as a manifestation of the intelligible form, or the
intelligible form is seen as a precondition of the material form, and the material form does not exist outside of its conception based on the intelligible
form. The material intelligible form, or universal material form, exists only
as a potential concept, which is material intellect, which is potentially all of
the concepts of universal material forms, and the material intelligible form
exists only as actuality when it is understood by intellect.
Material intellect is capable of receiving universal forms, intelligibles,
because of its partial separation from the corporeal, which contains only dif-
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ferentiated forms, the particulars of sense perception, as also explained by
Plotinus and Grosseteste. For Averroes, material intellect is not corporeal
because it can distinguish between sensible particulars and universal forms;
if it were corporeal it would not be able to do so, it would only be able to receive forms as differentiated and particular. As material intelligible forms, or
universal material forms, exist in material intellect, they exist as speculative
intelligibles which are generable and corruptible, subject to the mechanisms
of intellect. This is possible because there must be a cause of the generation
of the speculative intelligibles, something which allows material intellect to
bridge the corporeal and incorporeal.
Averroes and Plotinus
Though Averroes is not generally considered to be sympathetic to Neoplatonic thinking, there are definite parallels between the philosophies of intellect of Averroes and Plotinus. Both can be considered to be “Idealists” in
that intelligible form precedes sensible form in perception, and that the material intellect of Averroes or discursive reason of Plotinus, nous hylikos or pathetikos, depends in its functioning on the agent intellect of Averroes or
Intellectual Principle of Plotinus, nous poietikos. The formation of the image
in the oculus mentis is coincident with the formation of a thought, and the
sensible form is a transient residue of the permanent intelligible form, as if it
is reflected in a mirror and projected on a surface. For both philosophers,
material intellect and intellect not connected to sense perception are mediated by a kind of intellectus in habitu (intellectus speculativus), a practicing
intellect which leads the individual to higher forms of understanding. The
development of phantasmata or imprints of forms in the oculus mentis in the
imagination or phantasia is the product of a dialectical relation between the
mechanisms of sense perception in material intellect and an a priori understanding of forms in the intelligible, prior to the sensible. In order to be perceived, forms must be constructed, in a structuring of reality. For both
Plotinus and Averroes, the formae imaginativae or phantasmata in the
imaginatio are the mechanisms by which material intellect or dianoia is actualized by agent intellect or nous.
In the Enneads of Plotinus, I.6.3,32 shape is not something which is inherent to objects in sensual reality, but is rather something which is imposed
upon objects by human thought, in the nature of geometry and ordering principles. The sensible form given by the material intellect connected to sense
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perception is already a product of intellection. The shape of the impression
of the form of the object in Plotinus is something conceived, and joined to
the material object before it is received as an impression; the shape of the object is part of the a priori vocabulary by which intellect orders the sensual
world, and reaffirms the existence of the perceiving subject in the world. For
Plotinus, “When sense-perception, then, sees the form in bodies binding and
mastering the nature opposed to it, which is shapeless, and shape riding gloriously upon other shapes, it gathers into one that which appears dispersed
and brings it back and takes it in, now without parts, to the soul’s interior
and presents to it that which is within as something in tune with it…”. As for
Averroes, the form and shape which intellect imposes on bodies are mechanisms of intellect in sense perception.
Sense perception transfers the form of the body or material entity, as
conceptualized, according to Plotinus, “now without parts” (Enneads I.6.3);
the perceived form must correspond to the preconception of it, the intelligible form. Dianoia or discursive reason, actualized material intellect, described as “the reasoning power in soul” in Enneads V.3.2, makes judgments
about the sensible form given to it, which is already the product of judgments of the higher intellect, the Intellectual Principle, nous poietikos, the
presence of active intellect in actualized intellect, and organizes them in
combinations and divisions, corresponding to the principles of geometry and
mathematics. As the phantasmata or imprints of forms come to reasoning
power from intellect, “as for the things which come to it from Intellect, it observes what one might call their imprints…and it continues to acquire understanding as if by recognizing the new and recently arrived impressions and
fitting them to those which have long been within it,” in “recollections of the
soul,” according to Plotinus, as in an actualized intellect or intellectus in
habitu. Perception is the product of experience in the interaction of thought
and the sensible world, the dialectic of the incorporeal and corporeal, the
universal and particular.
In Enneads V.3.3, if sense perception is to make the details of form explicit, “it is taking to pieces what the image-making power gave it,” and if it
makes a judgment on the form, “its remark originates in what it knows
through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from itself…”. Discursive reason in material intellect does nothing other than process images of forms which it has already defined itself, through the relation
between active intellect and material intellect, Intellectual Principle and discursive reason. Without the capacity to understand the intelligible, the intel-
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ligible form in relation to the sensible form, material intellect can only be
unaware of the reality of the sensible world which is perceived, and unaware
of the role that it plays in the formation and definition of the sensible world
which it perceives as external to itself.
For Plotinus there can be no immediate sense perception of an object,
without the mediation of the mirror reflection of the intelligible form of the
object in intellect, the forma imaginativa of Averroes. In Enneads I.1.8, the
intelligible form in intellect becomes the sensible form in sense perception,
“not of itself and body, but abiding itself and giving images of itself, like a
face seen in many mirrors,” in the same way that active intellect presents the
intelligible to acquired intellect. Acquired intellect is only capable of receiving the intelligible to the extent of its limitations, as differentiated or sequentially arranged, in the same way that the mirror is only capable of receiving
an image according to its corporeal state, adjusted in size and position.
The discerning of impressions printed upon the intellect by sensation for
Plotinus is the function of discursive reason, not immediate sense perception.
Since the sensual impressions in perception are copies and derivatives of intelligible forms, perception itself is a copy and derivative of reason. Reason
in Plotinus is composed of mnemic residues of perceived objects, what Plotinus calls “imprints” in “recollections” in Enneads V.3.2. Thoughts are propelled by the desire created by the multiple and fragmented images of
perception as reconstructed in reason. In Enneads IV.7.6, sense perceptions
merge together in reason like lines coming together from the circumference
of the circle, from multiplicity to unity, subject to the ruling principles. In
reality, sense objects are variable and differentiated in terms of size and location; they are multiple and fragmented, and it is only the reason of the perceiver which allows them to be apprehended as whole and congruent. Sense
objects themselves cannot be immediately perceived as a congruent whole.
Once the diverse and multiple sense objects have been transformed into a
whole by apprehension in sense perception, they cannot return to their original state. Apprehension permanently transforms sensual reality in conformance with the principles of reason.
Perception, according to Plotinus, divides, multiplies, and otherwise organizes sensual reality; in other words, perception is an intellective process.
Perceived objects are divided and organized into parts which correspond directly to the organizational capacities of reason. The relation of parts and
subdivisions to the whole and to infinity is the same in the sense object as it
is in reasoning capacity. Geometry and mathematics are mechanisms by
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which sensual reality is represented by perception to reason, though sense
objects do not inherently contain geometrical and mathematical properties.
For Plotinus, discursive reason approaches nous, as material intellect approaches active intellect for Averroes, when reason recognizes its recent
sense impressions and “gathers into one that which appears dispersed and
brings it back and takes it in, now without parts,” the mnemic residue or
memory trace of previous sense impressions, in a process of reminiscence. In
the Enneads, while perception grasps the “impressions produced by sensation
on the living being” (I.1.7), through the mnemic residue, a perception is “a
mental image for that which is going to remember it” (IV.3.29), and the
“memory and the retention of the object” belong to the “image-making power” or the imagination or phantasia. In the representation in the mnemic residue, the intelligible form is present after the sensible form or perception is
gone, as for Averroes. Through memory, “an image accompanies every mental act,” as described in Enneads IV.3.30. Through the intelligible form the
intellectual act is without parts and has not come out into the open, but remains unobserved within, unknown to reason, suggesting the “unconscious”
element of thought for which Plotinus is known, and which plays a role in
the philosophy of Averroes.
Averroes and Grosseteste
Robert Grosseteste is believed to have known the Long Commentary of
Averroes, translated into Latin c. 1220, as evidenced in works by Grosseteste
such as the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (c. 1230), and the
Hexaëmeron (On the Six Days of Creation, 1237), written shortly before or at
the time Grosseteste became Bishop of Lincoln.33 In the Hexaëmeron (VIII,
IV, 7),34 the sensible form or species sensibilis is given by the intelligible
form or species apprehensibilis, which is formed in the imagination or phantasia and is presented to discursive reason in the process of perception. The
active intellect illuminates the species apprehensibilis, what is intelligible in
the species, in the species sensibilis as formed by the phantasia or imaginatio, from the imprint in sense perception, which is then given to passive intellect. The species apprehensibilis is a similitude of the species sensibilis, as a
mnemic residue, and is thus a representation of the species sensibilis, which
is itself a representation of the object to which its form corresponds
(Hexaëmeron VIII, IV, 9–10).
In his Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle (I.14, 235–
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38),35 Grosseteste compares (but does not equate) intelligentia, divine intellect, to the intellectus agens, agent intellect, or actio intellectus, active intellect, the intellect which is differentiated from the passive, material intellect,
in the De anima of Aristotle. Like the actio intellectus of Aristotle, the intelligentia of Grosseteste illuminates the lower functions of intellect, virtus
cogitativa and intellectus in habitu, as described by Averroes in the Long
Commentary. The mediating factor suggested by Averroes in the De anima
of the intellectus adeptus or speculativus, between the active and material intellects, is not developed by Grosseteste, as it was by Averroes.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics (II.6.17–21), universals
(principia) exist in intellect potentially, and are activated to actuality, as in
the De anima of Aristotle the potential, material intellect is activated by the
intellectus agens (what Grosseteste calls the virtus intellectiva). For Grosseteste, sense knowledge plays a role in the activation of the material intellect. Sense perception is not the cause of knowledge, but rather is the
condition by which knowledge is possible (I.18, 133–34). As in Aristotle,
Plotinus and Averroes, reason, virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva, apprehends
the intelligible form as a singular or individual, while the virtus intellectiva,
actio intellectus or intellectus agens, illuminated by intelligentia, apprehends
the intelligible in its totality, as universal knowledge (I.18, 136, 164–65).
For Grosseteste, the active intellect is identified as the virtus intellectiva
in combination with the intelligentia. Grosseteste follows Averroes as seeing
the intelligible form, species apprehensibilis, formed by the virtus intellectiva in combination with the intelligentia (as active intellect). In Grosseteste
the virtus cogitativa plays less of a role in the formation of the intelligible,
given the irradiatio spiritualis of the intelligentia, reflecting the influence of
Neoplatonic illumination theory in the interpretation of the Aristotelian doctrine. In the Enneads (V.3.8), “And this light shining in the soul illuminates
it; that is, it makes it intelligent; that is, it makes it like itself, the light
above.” In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, the lux spiritualis
“floods over intelligible objects (res intelligibiles),” and “over the mind’s eye
(oculus mentis),” and “stands to the interior eye (oculus interior) and to intelligible objects as the corporeal sun stands to the bodily eye and to visible
corporeal objects” (I.17, 39–42),36 following Aristotle, Plotinus and
Averroes. For Grosseteste, the lumen spiritualis, light produced by the lux
spiritualis, allows the mental sight, the visus mentalis, to apprehend the intelligible in the virtus intellectiva, as the light of the sun, the lumen solare,
makes vision possible. The lumen spiritualis is the “first visible” in interior
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sight, visus interior, as the colored body is the first thing receptive of the
light of the sun, recalling Aristotle and Averroes.
Conclusion
Averroes, in the Long Commentary on the De anima, displays a connection
to the thought of Plotinus, perhaps as filtered through the Theology of Aristotle or the Fons Vitae of Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol; translated by
John Avendeath and Domenicus Gundissalinus, Canon of Segovia, c. 1150).
The theory of knowledge by illumination promoted by Averroes is
influenced by Neoplatonism; a similar view can be found in the Fons Vitae,
the De anima of Gundissalinus, and the De intellectu of Alexander of
Aphrodisias (who was known to have influenced Plotinus). Avicebron
described the active intellect as a transcendent and incorporeal, cosmic
intellect, illuminating the anima rationalis. Averroes suggests a kind of
world soul in which individual souls participate, something also promoted by
Plotinus.
Subsequently, Averroes influenced the thinking of Latin scholastics in
the concept of the active intellect as the incorporeal agent leading the potential, material intellect to actuality, a concept also found in Alexander of Aphrodisias and Avicebron. Robert Grosseteste may have also been influenced
by the Theology of Aristotle or the Fons Vitae. According to Roger Bacon,
Adam Marsh accepted the incorporeal active intellect as a divine intellect, as
did Robert Grosseteste, who distinguished a divine or cosmic intellect, intelligentia, from an agent intellect, virtus intellectiva, which actualizes a material intellect, virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva. This distinction can be found
in the writings of Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, and John Peckham. These
three writers, along with Grosseteste, Adam Marsh, and William of Auvergne, also see the divine intellect, the intelligentia, as illuminating the anima rationalis, in the irradiatio spiritualis of the lumen spiritualis, reflected
spiritual light, in the synthesis of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic influences anticipated by Averroes.
Brentano and Merlan characterize Averroes as a mystic. Averroes expounds “eccentric mysticism” according to Brentano,37 and a “neoAristotelian counterpart of the unio mystica,” which can be seen as rationalistic mysticism, involving a “flood of sheer light” and “absolute transparency”
in intellect, according to Merlan.38 But as Davidson points out, Averroes rejected the idea propagated by Avicenna that scientific knowledge can be attained through prophecy without following scientific procedures. For
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Averroes, the three forms of prophecy, dreams, clairvoyance and revelation,
are products of active intellect. Revelation and prophecy cannot be compared
to reason as forms of scientific knowledge, a very un-mystical approach for a
medieval philosopher. Ascension to active intellect in Averroes should be
seen as a higher functioning of human intellect towards a unitary thought
with universal laws governing the physical world, communicated by emanation, rather than as the mystical ecstasy as characterized by Merlan. The suggestion of the mystical aspect obscures the importance of Averroes’
rationalistic philosophy of intellect, a philosophy which lays foundations for
Scholastics to Idealists to twentieth-century Structural Linguistics.
The dialectic of the material and active intellects, between the individual
particulars of sense experience in the intellectus passibilis and the universal
matrix into which they are inserted and actualized, to participate in intellect,
plays a role in the Vorstellung (picture thinking) of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit, and the concept of la langue (the matrix of rules that govern language in synchronic linguistics) in the Course in
General Linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. For example, in the Phenomenology, Vorstellung is the “synthetic combination of sensuous immediacy
and its universality or Thought.”39 According to Saussure, “synchronic linguistics will be concerned with the logical and psychological relations that
bind together coexisting terms and form a system in the collective mind of
the speakers…” (la langue).40 Echoes of Averroes can be heard in both of
these concepts.
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